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Abstract
Social technologies have made it possible to propagate disinformation and
manipulate the masses at an unprecedented scale. This is particularly
alarming from a security perspective, as humans have proven to be the
weakest link when protecting critical infrastructure in general, and the
power grid in particular. Here, we consider an attack in which an adver-
sary attempts to manipulate the behavior of energy consumers by sending
fake discount notifications encouraging them to shift their consumption
into the peak-demand period. We conduct surveys to assess the propen-
sity of people to follow-through on such notifications and forward them to
their friends. This allows us to model how the disinformation propagates
through social networks. Finally, using Greater London as a case study,
we show that disinformation can indeed be used to orchestrate an attack
wherein unwitting consumers synchronize their energy-usage patterns, re-
sulting in blackouts on a city-scale. These findings demonstrate that in an
era when disinformation can be weaponized, system vulnerabilities arise
not only from the hardware and software of critical infrastructure, but
also from the behavior of the consumers.
Introduction
Social technologies have dramatically altered the ways in which conflicts are fought. By allowing belliger-
ents to command the public narrative, these technologies have created a paradigm wherein the most viral
information can influence the outcome of wars [1]. This phenomenon has been exacerbated by social media
algorithms that value virality over veracity [2, 3]. Unsurprisingly, many notable skirmishes in recent years
have used disinformation to manipulate peoples’ behavior [1, 4]. Such campaigns have become particularly
effective due to the ever-increasing prevalence of big data and machine learning techniques that allow the
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behavioral patterns of the masses to be analyzed with unprecedented precision. Among the clearest manifes-
tations of such campaigns are the alleged Russian interference into the 2016 US presidential election and the
Brexit referendum [5, 6]. These incidents suggest that the microtargeting capabilities provided by companies
such as Cambridge Analytica [7] can indeed be weaponized [8] to influence the long-term decisions of a society.
While many studies have analyzed campaigns targeting long-term social behavior manipulation [2, 9–12],
little attention has been given to targeted attacks that use disinformation as a weapon to manipulate social
behavior within a limited time span.
One particularly sensitive target that is vulnerable to behavioral manipulation is critical infrastructure,
the attack of which may have drastic implications nationwide. For instance, despite high levels of security,
human operators proved to be the weakest link during the Stuxnet attack on the Iranian nuclear program,
unwittingly introducing malware into the facilities [13, 14]. Another attack of this kind that drew concern
from governments worldwide was the Ukrainian power grid cyberattack of 2015 [15, 16]. In this incident, at-
tackers deliberately cut off the power supply for 230,000 residents for several hours using operator credentials
harvested through one particular form of disinformation, namely, spear-phishing [17].
In this study we focus on the power grid—a choice motivated by the devastation caused by historical
power outages including human casualties and massive financial losses [18–20]. Yet, while numerous blackout
prevention and mitigation strategies have been proposed in the literature [21–32], the link between disin-
formation and blackouts has never been studied to date. Driven by this observation, we seek to answer
the following question: can an adversary bring down a city’s power grid using disinformation without any
physical or cyber intrusions?
Attack propagation through social networks
We consider an attack in which an adversary attempts to manipulate the behavior of citizens by sending fake
discount notifications encouraging them to shift their energy consumption into the peak-demand period. Such
a shift may result in the tripping of overloaded power lines, leading to blackouts (see Methods). Ultimately,
the success of such an attack depends on the follow-through rate, i.e., the fraction of people who behave
as intended by the attacker. Here, the social aspect plays a crucial role, since people may unknowingly
amplify the attack by forwarding the disinformation notification to their friends, who in turn forward it to
their own friends, and so on; see Fig. 1a for an illustration. (Note that the term “friend” is borrowed from
the context of social media to refer to any “acquaintance”.) To model the spread of disinformation in the
social network, we use two standard models of influence propagation, namely, independent cascade [33], and
linear threshold [34]. While a person may receive the same notification from more than one friend, the main
difference between the two models lies in the way in which that person is influenced by such repeated exposure
to the notification. In the independent cascade model, every exposure has an independent probability to
persuade the recipient to modify their behavior—these probabilities constitute the main parameters of the
model. In contrast, each person in the linear threshold model has a “threshold” specifying the number of
exposures required for them to modify their behavior—these thresholds constitute the main parameters of
the model; see Methods for more details.
In our simulations, the values of these parameters are determined based on the responses of 5,124 surveyed
participants who were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk. Specifically, the participants were shown
a message notifying them of a discount of 50% in their electricity rate from 8PM to 10PM. They were then
asked to specify the likelihood of them changing their electricity-use patterns to take advantage of this
discount, and the likelihood of them forwarding this message to their friends. We tested two factors that
may influence the behavior of the participants: (i) the notification sender, and (ii) the notification content.
As for the first factor, while such notifications are typically received from the power utility, we analyzed the
cases when they are instead received from either a stranger or a friend. We considered these two possibilities
since some people may receive the spoofed message directly from the attacker (who is a stranger to them),
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Fig. 1. An overview of a disinformation attack on the power system. a, Illustrating how the
disinformation attack is launched from a single attacker and amplified via propagation in social networks,
thereby altering the energy consumption patterns of a portion of the population. Importantly, not every
recipient follows-through, nor does a recipient have to follow-through in order to forward the notification.
b, The disinformation notification shown to participants in different conditions, which vary depending on
whether or not the notifications contain an external link, and whether the sender is a stranger (assumed to
be the attacker who uses spoofing services to mask the sender as SMSAlert) or a friend (named John Smith
in the survey).
while others may receive it indirectly through friends who forward it to them. As for the second factor—the
notification content—we analyzed two variants: one where the discount can only be availed by clicking on an
external link, and another where the discount is unconditional. This manipulation allows us to understand
the differences, if any, between the context of phishing and spam attacks—which require the recipients to
click on an external link embedded in the message—and the context of our disinformation attack—where no
such link is necessary. Accordingly, the participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: (i)
receive a notification with a link from a stranger; (ii) receive a notification without a link from a stranger;
(iii) receive a notification with a link from a friend; (iv) receive a notification without a link from a friend.
The corresponding messages that were displayed to participants are depicted in Fig. 1b. They were then
asked questions to determine how they would react to these messages. Here, participants were further split
into two groups depending on the influence model being studied, since the parameters of each model require
the questions to be framed differently. The complete survey along with a summary of the results is provided
in Supplementary Note 1.
Next, the survey outcomes were used to evaluate the extent to which the attack is amplified when the
notification is propagated in a social network. To this end, we conducted simulations on 100 randomly
generated scale-free networks [35], each consisting of 1 million nodes, with an average degree of 10. For
each node, its propensity to follow-through and forward the notification is set to match that of a randomly-
chosen survey participant. Within our simulations, nodes that receive the notification forward it to k of
their friends with a probability that corresponds to their respective preferences. For instance, if k = 3 and
a participant specifies their likelihood of forwarding the message to be 50%, then the corresponding node
chooses 3 friends at random, and forwards the notification to each of them with a probability of 50%. Every
simulation proceeds in time steps as follows. The nodes that receive the notification in a time step t may
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Fig. 2. Attack diffusion. Analyzing the follow-through rates when the attacker initially sends the noti-
fication to 200,000 individuals in scale-free networks consisting of 1 million individuals, given two influence
propagation models (independent cascade and linear threshold) and three values of k (representing the num-
ber of friends to whom each recipient considers forwarding the notification). The vertical lines indicate the
number of people who follow-through at the peak energy demand period when each time step takes 1h, 2h,
and 3h, assuming that the attack is launched 6 hours prior to this period. a, The average number of people
who follow-through after each time step of the spread of disinformation. b, The relative increase in the
number of people who follow-through due to the omission of the link from the notification.
decide to follow-through (depending on their preferences), and may forward it to their friends (i.e., the other
nodes that are connected to them in the network) who would then receive it in time step t+ 1. This process
continues until the state of the network remains unchanged in two consecutive time steps. Given the two
influence propagation models and k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, Fig. 2a depicts the average number of people who follow-
through in each time step, assuming that the initial notification is sent to 20% of the individuals in the social
network. The vertical lines in the figure indicate the follow-through rates at the peak demand period when
each time step takes 1h, 2h, and 3h, assuming that the initial notification is sent 6h before this period. As
can be seen, even if each time step takes 3 hours, the percentage of people following-through can reach as
high as 23.7%, and no less than 11.7% according to the most conservative estimate. Recall that unlike the
case of phishing and spam attacks, the disinformation attack considered here does not require an external
link. To evaluate how this difference affects the impact of the attack, we run similar simulations based on
the responses of participants who were shown a message containing an external link. We found that the
omission of the link always increases the follow-through rate. For instance, even if each time step takes 3h,
the increment ranges from 4.8% to 10.2%; see Fig. 2b. As shown in Supplementary Note 2, similar results
were obtained when the initial notification was sent to 10% and 30% of the individuals in the network.
Attack impact on the power grid
Having analyzed the number of people who follow-through on the notification, we now analyze the impact
caused by such behavior manipulation on the power grid. To this end, we modelled the power grid of
Greater London (see Supplementary Note 3) and simulated the behavior of residential energy consumers.
Importantly, our model considers residential electric vehicle (EV) adoption since the owners of such EVs
control a substantial amount of deferrable energy, and thus can cause greater harm when manipulated by an
adversary. We vary the EV adoption level in the city, and model the capacity upgrades that are necessary
for the grid to support the demand corresponding to each such level [36–38]. Fig. 3a presents the percentage
of consumers who experience a blackout given varying follow-through and EV adoption rates. As can be
seen, increasing the EV adoption up to 20% increases the system vulnerability to the attack, whereas beyond
20%, the system resilience increases, i.e., it requires a greater follow-through rate to achieve the same attack
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Fig. 3. Impact of an attack on the power distribution network of Greater London. a, The
percentage of consumers suffering from a blackout as a result of the attack given different follow-through
rates and EV adoption rates. The figure also highlights the columns corresponding to projected EV adoption
rates for the UK in the years 2020, 2030, 2040, and 2050. b, Visualization of the status of every power
distribution line in the system for a follow-through and EV adoption rates of 0.17 and 0.20, respectively.
Grey indicates active lines, whereas red indicates lines that have tripped as a result of overloading. c, The
same as (b), but for follow-through and EV adoption rates of 0.12 and 0.20, respectively.
magnitude. This trend is caused by two opposing forces: (i) increased vulnerability due to the consumers
controlling more deferrable energy, and (ii) increased resilience due to the grid’s upgraded capacity. When
the EV adoption is smaller than or equal to 20%, the former force outweighs the latter, and hence we see
an increase in the system vulnerability. The opposite is true when the EV adoption exceeds 20%, leading to
the observed increase in resilience.
Now, consider the case when the EV adoption is 20% and the attack is launched 6 hours prior to the peak
demand period. Assuming that every time step in the influence propagation takes 1h, the follow-through rate
ranges from 11% to 30% (see Fig. 2a), resulting in a blackout for 7.3% to 100% of the residents, respectively
(see Fig. 3a). To put it differently, behavioral manipulation through disinformation can lead to a full blackout
at the city-scale. Next, to get a sense of the distribution of the blackout across the city, we depict the state of
the system corresponding to two different cells in the heat map; see Fig. 3b and 3c. As can be observed, the
impact is dispersed throughout the city rather than being concentrated in very few massive pockets. Note
that the results shown thus far are for the case where, for any given EV adoption rate, the grid is assumed
to be upgraded to support exactly that rate. However, if the grid is upgraded to support more than this
rate, the impact of the attack will be substantially alleviated. Taking the year 2025 as an example, if by
then the grid was not upgraded since 2020, then a mere 5% follow-through rate can bring the grid down
completely. On the other hand, if the grid in 2025 was upgraded to support the projected EV adoption until
2030, then even a 100% follow-through rate would cause a blackout for less than 20% of the residents. These
results highlight the need for future grid upgrades to not only be dictated by the technical aspects governed
by physical laws, but also consider the behavioral aspects of the consumers who may act unpredictably and
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irrationally, especially when subjected to disinformation. However, since grid upgrades come at a high cost
to the power utility [38], perhaps a more realistic solution would be to focus on increasing the awareness of
the consumers and immunizing them against disinformation.
Discussion
While the literature on power grids focuses on the advantages of increasing the active consumer engagement
and coordinating their consumption patterns [37–40], we demonstrated that such engagement makes the
grid more vulnerable to behavior manipulation attacks. In particular, we showed how an adversary can
use disinformation to manipulate the behavior of energy consumers by sending them fake notifications that
encourage them to shift their energy usage into the peak demand period. Our surveys showed that people
are willing to not only follow-through on such notifications, but also forward them to their friends, thereby
amplifying the attack. This is partly attributed to the fact that such notifications, unlike those used in
spam and phishing attacks, do not include any external links in the message. We quantified the impact
of such an attack on a city-scale, taking Greater London as an example and considering the projected EV
adoption levels in the city. This demonstrated that an adversary can indeed cause blackouts throughout the
city, without tampering with the hardware or hacking into the control systems of the power grid, but rather
focusing entirely on behavior manipulation. On a broader note, our study is the first to demonstrate that
in an era when disinformation can be weaponized, system vulnerabilities arise not only from the hardware
and software of critical infrastructure, but also from the behavior of the consumers.
Methods
Disinformation content. The lines in the power grid have limited capacity that cannot easily be expanded
due to financial constraints. Consequently, legacy networks are often unable to support extremely unlikely
scenarios, e.g., when the peak demand increases abruptly in a totally unexpected manner as in the scenario
considered in our paper. This limitation is further exacerbated by the inclusion of EVs, which have the
highest real power consumption compared to household appliances. Given this limitation, an adversary may
engineer a scenario aimed at breaching the capacity limits of the power lines. One way to achieve this goal
is to persuade as many people as possible to shift their energy consumption into the peak demand period,
when the grid is already at its most vulnerable state. In our setting, this is achieved by spreading a fake
discount message informing people of a discount effective during the peak period.
Models of influence. We use two fundamental models of influence propagation in social networks, namely,
independent cascade [33] and linear threshold [34]. Both models start with an “active” subset of nodes,
called the seed set. Then, the influence of these active nodes propagates through the network in time steps.
Formally, let V denote the set of nodes in the network, and Nv denote the neighbors of node v ∈ V . Moreover,
let A(t) ⊆ V be the set of active nodes at time step t, implying that A(1) is the seed set. The mechanism
of influence propagation depends on the model being used. In the independent cascade model, every pair of
nodes has an activation probability, p : V × V → [0, 1]. Then, in each time step t > 1, every node v that
became active at time step t−1 activates every inactive neighbor w ∈ Nv \A(t−1) with probability p(v, w).
The propagation terminates when A(t) = A(t− 1). On the other hand, in the linear threshold model, every
node v ∈ V is assigned a threshold, kv, such that 0 ≤ kv ≤ |Nv|. Then, in each time step t > 1, every
node v ∈ V \ A(t − 1) becomes active if the following holds: |A(t − 1) ∩Nv| ≥ kv. Again, the propagation
terminates when A(t) = A(t− 1).
In our study, we introduced three modifications to the influence propagation models in order to reflect the
attack scenario being considered. First, we decoupled the state of being activated from the state of influencing
others. Specifically, being activated in our setting means deciding to follow-through on the notification being
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received. In contrast, influencing neighbors means forwarding the notification to one’s friends. As such, one
may be activated without necessarily influencing others, and vice versa. The second modification involved
distinguishing between those who receive the notification from a stranger (who is the attacker in our case)
and those who receive it from their friends (who forwarded the notification to them). This distinction
matters, since the way in which recipients react to the notification is affected by the identity of the sender,
as evident from the outcome of our surveys (see Supplementary Note 1). The third modification involved
allowing the individuals to influence only a subset of their friends. This makes the model more realistic, since
people are usually not restricted to forwarding a message to either all or none of their friends. It should
be noted that for an individual to be included in the seed set, it is not sufficient for them to simply receive
the notification from the stranger; they have to also decide to forward it to their friends. This is especially
important in the linear threshold model, since our definition of the seed set means that the model cannot be
parameterized solely based on thresholds; it also needs parameters specifying the likelihood of the nodes to
forward a notification received from a stranger.
The influence propagation models used in our simulations were parameterized based on the survey out-
comes. In particular, for the independent cascade model, each participant specified (i) their likelihood to
follow-through, and (ii) their likelihood to forward the notification, when the participant received it either
from a stranger or a friend (note that an individual may first receive the notification from the stranger,
and then again from a friend at a later time step). On the other hand, for the linear threshold model,
participants specified (i) their likelihood to follow-through and forward the notification when received from
a stranger, and (ii) the number of friends that they need to receive the notification from in order for them to
follow-through and forward it to others (see Supplementary Note 1). Participants specified their likelihoods
on a Likert scale from 0 to 10. Each response, x ∈ [0, 10], was then converted to the probability x10 . Finally,
in our simulations, the number of friends that each individual considered forwarding the notification to was
determined based on a parameter k ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Power grid specifications. Due to its sensitivity, comprehensive data describing the power distribution
network of Greater London is not publicly available. We therefore built our own model based on data
obtained from OpenStreetMap [41], under the reasonable assumption that power lines (i.e., overhead lines
or cables) are laid alongside roads. In particular, we start by extracting the road network and the location
of every building therein. Next, we obtain the locations of the 9 substations that feed Greater London [42].
Note that each building is electrically connected to a single substation, which is typically the one closest to it.
With this in mind, we divide the road network of Greater London into 9 subnetworks, one per substation, and
construct 9 spanning trees connecting the buildings within each subnetwork to the corresponding substation.
We construct these spanning trees using a modified version of Kruskal’s algorithm [43] while taking into
consideration various technical and economical constraints. The edges in these spanning trees represent the
power lines in our simulations. As for the loading of each line in the power grid, we assume that every building
represents a household, the energy consumption of which is modelled using statistics obtained from [44, 45].
For more details, see Supplementary Notes 3 and 4.
Power simulations. Since the energy consumption of a residence depends on its occupancy [44], residences
in our simulation were assigned occupancy values based on UK National Statistics [45]. As for the EVs,
we restrict our attention to residential rather than commercial EVs, since the latter have a negligible effect
on the peak demand when compared to the former [46]. In each simulation, EV owners and notification
recipients were selected randomly based on the EV adoption rate and disinformation propagation rate in
the simulation, respectively. Each resident was assigned a daily load profile depending on whether they own
an EV and whether they follow-through on the notification (see Supplementary Note 4 for how these load
profiles were generated). Subsequently, power flows within the distribution network were calculated. Finally,
we make the reasonable assumption that the capacity of each line in the distribution network is limited to
10% over the peak power flow in that line under regular circumstances, i.e., when no resident receives the
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notification from the attacker.
Finally, we analyze how the distribution network is affected by the attack. In this analysis, among the
many variables that could be considered such as voltage and reactive power flows, we focused on line capacity
limits since they are the most dominantly affected by energy consumption patterns, and are the most critical
to power system stability [36, 38]. Once a line overloads it goes offline, leading all lines below it in the power
distribution tree to go offline as well. By averaging over 100 such simulations, we obtained the fraction
of residences suffering from a blackout that were depicted in Fig. 3a. The illustrations in Fig. 3b and 3c
represent a single simulation each.
Ethics statement
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Data availability
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